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I.

INTRODUCTION

Originalism perseveres, and it is becoming increasingly
1
dangerous. The doctrine of originalism, in its strong or pure
† Professor of Political Science, Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois. Ph.D.,
University of Minnesota.
1. The term “originalism” is credited to Paul Brest. Earl M. Maltz, The
Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 43 n.1
(1987) (pointing out that “originalism” was first used in Paul Brest, Misguided Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)). Earlier discussions
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form, maintains that judges have no power to interpret the United
States Constitution except in accordance with the substantive intent
2
of the people who created it at the end of the eighteenth century.
Although many scholars have little respect for the doctrine of
originalism, it retains a hold on the legal and general public.
The notion of limiting a court’s power to the principles
accepted long ago resonates with the general public and it
3
legitimizes court rulings. Distinguished law professor Earl Maltz
observed that “the concepts embodied in originalism rather plainly
reflect views on the nature of judging which have a strong intuitive

sometimes used the terms “interpretivism” or “intentionalism” as synonyms. Id.
2. “Strong” originalists insist that the founding generation had substantive
intentions about the way the Constitution was to be interpreted and applied, and
this substantive intent can be determined by examining the voluminous literature,
historical records, and ratification debates left to us by the framers. At its extreme,
“strong” originalism assumes that the framers anticipated or at least said
something relevant about a wide range of modern policy issues. “Those who
framed the Constitution chose their words carefully . . . . The language they chose
meant something.” Edwin Meese III, The Attorney General’s View of the Supreme Court:
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 704 (1985). Meese
further wrote that:
[T]he Founders believed [the judges] would not fail to regard the
Constitution as ‘fundamental law’ and would ‘regulate their decisions’ by
it . . . . The judges were expected to resist any political effort to depart
from the literal provisions of the Constitution. The text of the document
and the original intention of those who framed it would be the judicial
standard in giving effect to the Constitution.
Id at 701. Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding, and David F. Forte edited a book of
short essays that purport to give the original meanings of each clause of the
constitution. THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION (Meese III et al. eds.,
2005).
A somewhat weaker, or less “pure,” form of originalism is described
approvingly by Judge Bork: “What distinguishes interpretivism [or intentionalism]
from its opposite is its insistence that the work of the political branches is to be
invalidated only in accord with an inference whose starting point, whose
underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the [C]onstitution.” Robert H. Bork,
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826
(1986) (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–2 (1980)). For a
recent and comprehensive discussion of the history of originalism as a legal
doctrine, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). See also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J.
1113, 1164–1214 (2003); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in
Judicial Review, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997).
3. See Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611
(1999); see also John Brigham, Original Intent and Other Cult Classics, GOOD SOC’Y,
2002, at 13–17, available at http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~jbrigham/Original
.html.
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4

appeal to many Americans.” Chief Justice William Rehnquist
thought it a fatal flaw that “[o]ne senses no . . . connection with a
popularly adopted constituent act” among the opponents of the
5
orginalist interpretive method.
The doctrine of originalism intuitively seems necessary to the
rule of law, limited governance, and the avoidance of judicial
6
decisions based on personal ideology, bias, or simple caprice.
Above all, originalism rests on the fundamental notion of a
contract. The existence of a contract reveals that at some point in
the past, promises were made, limits were willingly agreed to, and a
7
deal was struck. The contract compels us to accept that once
8
made, we ought to keep our promises. Once accepted, we ought
to obey the agreed-to limits. A deal is a deal, and we ought to
respect it even if, after the passage of time, it does not turn out as
we expected. These are the underlying principles of a contract.
Associating the Constitution with these widely accepted
principles allows originalism to ignore several practical problems
with the doctrine. The founding generation does not have a

4. Maltz, supra note 1, at 44. Tim LaHaye, a minister, political activist, and
co-author of the Left Behind series of Biblical prophecy novels writes that
[t]he supreme issue of our day is whether or not we shall continue to
allow unelected liberal judicial activists to make laws that were never in
the minds of our Founding Fathers. Shouldn’t these judges utilize
judicial restraint and base their decisions on what the [C]onstitution
means, leaving the lawmaking and constitutional changes up to Congress
and the voters, through the constitutionally mandated process?
Tim LaHaye, The Colossal Battle, ESQUIRE, Sept. 2004, at 179 (emphasis added).
5. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, in JUDGES ON
JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 141, 144 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997).
6. Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 567, 568 (1991). The need to control otherwise uncontrollable
judges is a major thrust behind the political advocacy of originalism. See, e.g.,
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990).
7. Among the synonyms for “contract” are words like promise, commitment,
obligation, pact, pledge, vow, and “gave their word.” James McElhaney, The Right
Words, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2005, at 24–25.
8. A contract consists of a promise that is made in such a way that it creates a
legally enforceable obligation. See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 2 (1999)
(describing legal characterizations of contracts). The positive law makes rules
governing the kinds of promises that are legally enforceable and the ways in which
they must be made. Id. However, the moral force of contract law, the feeling that
it is right and proper for the government to compel their enforcement, is based
on the moral obligation to keep promises. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE 9–21 (1981).
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singular voice. Instead, the framers at the 1787 Convention, the
kibitzers arguing in newspaper editorials, and the individuals
responsible for the Constitution’s ratification sometimes said
9
contradictory things. Consequently, difficulties arise in defining
the deal and negotiations agreed to by the founding generation.
Likewise, originalists are not able to identify which sources should
10
be used to determine what these founding parties actually said or
11
what was actually meant.
Supporters of originalism ignore other practical flaws. The
framers themselves “did not believe such an interpretive strategy to
9. Much of the surviving record comes from newspaper editorials.
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison tried to describe how the
constitutionally created government would work and to explain why it would be an
improvement while allaying fears about a devolution into tyranny. The scope of
the constitutional debate is illustrated by their eighty-five editorials collected as
The Federalist. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (1788). Opponents of the
Constitution replied with equally persuasive documents. See, e.g., THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert Storing ed., 1981). They quoted Locke as well as other
philosophers and historians who commented on the proper scope and nature of
government. Ministers searched for relevant biblical passages, and businessmen
must have pondered, as businessmen always do, what arrangements would be most
favorable to businesses. In letters, diaries, and journals, members of the founding
generation communicated their questions, reservations, doubts, fears, and
recriminations. See generally DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 177 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); Isaac Kramnick, The “Great National
Discussion”: The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988).
10. Cf. Kesevan & Paulsen, supra note 2 (discussing the interpretive
significance of the limited records extant from the 1787 Constitutional
Convention). The authors explain that since the convention kept its proceedings
secret, Madison’s notes and other records were not available to the ratifiers. Id.
Thus, the record reflects the intent of the drafters, but they can have no
relationship to the intent of the larger group of ratifiers.
11. See Judith A. Baer, The Fruitless Search for Original Intent, in JUDGING THE
CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 49 (Michael W. McCann &
Gerald Houseman eds., 1989); Ira C. Lupu, Textualism and Original Understanding:
Time, the Supreme Court, and the Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324 (1998) (on
the changing attitudes toward The Federalist); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987). In addition to the canonical and easily
available writings of the founding generation, historians have brought to light an
enormous mass of details that were previously unknown. This material is arcane,
unclear, and often contradictory, revealing, if anything, that the founders were
themselves unsure of their purposes and often disagreed. See JACK RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 1–22 (1990). Originalists have been accused, with good reason, of
radically oversimplifying this record. DAVID A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS 17 (2002); Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE
L.J. 1419, 1423 (1990).
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12

be appropriate.”
There is no practical way to adjust the
eighteenth-century concepts, even if they were precisely known, to
the world of the twenty-first century, and trying to do so could lead
to such limited choices for policymakers that it would give rise to
13
bad government and bad law. Trying to consistently apply a single
interpretive method, although superficially plausible and even
attractive, is ultimately doomed to fail when it meets the complexity
14
of the modern real world. Indeed, supporters of originalism have
15
been accused of inconsistency and even incoherence, while the
singular interpretive method has been labeled too facile,
16
unworkable, and undesirable.
Originalists reply to such practical objections by retreating to
17
even weaker versions of the theory. In weak forms of originalism,
contemporary judges do not need to do exactly what the framers
would have done. They merely need to consider what the framers
might have thought about some modern problem or to give some
level of respect to the Constitution’s formation and some doctrinal
12. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 885 (1985); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1089–95 (1989).
13. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intent in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 237–57 (1988).
But see Brigham, supra note 3, at 13–17 (observing that at least in its strong form,
originalism “sets the heavy hand of the dead to control the choices of the living”).
14. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 11 (arguing that “foundationalism” will
lead to “radical results”). These critiques are purely practical in nature, and they
demonstrate the difficulties in employing originalism and the undesirable
consequences that may result. But they do not counter the normative desirability
of originalism that supports the need to keep promises and to live up to a deal
once made. Scholars have not presented clear reasons why we should refrain from
framing constitutional questions with reference to the founders, why we should
not at least try our best to determine what the founders agreed to, and why we
should not consider ourselves bound by whatever glimmerings of original intent
we can find. Richard S. Kay shows how some of the practical objections to
originalism can be rebutted and he makes clear that the preference for a single
interpretive method is a value choice that cannot be rebutted by showing that the
chosen method is impractical. Kay, supra note 13. For further discussion on the
lack of a definitive principled rebuttal to originalism, see Maltz, supra note 1. See
also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 137, 138 (1996).
15. J. D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology of Unenumerated
Rights, MICH. ST. L. REV. 809, 810–12 (1999).
16. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING
BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 7 (1999); see also Brest, supra note 1.
17. But see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1114, 1134–48 (tracing the
history of this devolution and arguing that originalism is “a theory working itself
pure” rather than an idea being watered down by its supporters to save it from its
detractors).
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effect to the motives of the people who staged its creation. Thus,
18
original intent has given way to “moderate originalism,” “original
19
20
21
meaning,”
“original public meaning,”
“core meanings,”
22
“interpretive constitutional textuality,” and analogized “objectified
23
At the very least, originalists can invoke the ghost of
intent.”
Churchill, who famously observed that democracy is a very bad
form of government whose only redeeming virtue was that all the
other forms were much worse, in order to argue that however
much originalism falls short in practice, it remains the least-worst
24
form of constitutional interpretation.
As a result, originalism
persists.
In its weakened form, originalism may represent the dominant
paradigm utilized by the judiciary. It is capable of being stretched
to any extreme. American legal scholar Robert Bork claims to have
found some original principle or intent placed into the
Constitution by eighteenth-century slave owners that is consistent
25
with our contemporary abhorrence of racism. He argues that the
18. Brest, supra note 1, at 222–23, 231–34.
19. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 611, 621. Barnett eventually presents a weak
form of originalism, which he argues meets most of the practical scholarly
objections. Id. See also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:
Not as Radical as It Sounds (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-08,
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=714982.
20. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1146–47.
21. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 26 (1971). But see McConnell, supra note 2; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 119, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925558.
22. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINALISM 120–21 (2005).
23. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 17 (1997).
24. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989) (“Having described what I consider the principal difficulties with the
originalist and nonoriginalist approaches, I suppose I owe it to the listener to say
which of the two evils I prefer. It is originalism.”)
25. BORK, supra note 21, at 30–31. If Robert Bork believes that the
Constitution contains some tangible provisions that forbid slavery, it is because he
is a decent person who cannot bring himself to believe that the Constitution does
not share his abhorrence of slavery. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin has argued that
Bork’s approach is so loose that both liberal and conservative agendas could use
the same arguments. Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657,
658 (1990); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug.
13, 1987, at 3. Dworkin himself illustrates this looseness of fit. He finds only the
most general and abstract principles in the Constitution, but uses them to cover
specific recent cases. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). Thus, on
the assumption that the founders meant to protect some minority interests from
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founders neglected to specify who is entitled to equality within the
Constitution, but they nonetheless adhered to a general, abstract
26
principle requiring equality under the law. Furthermore, Bork
argues that the founders would have made slavery yield to equality
if they had known what we know about the evil effects of
27
segregation.
These arguments are facially inconsistent with the forms of
inequality dictated by the founders, including the notorious clause
that labels individuals of certain races as counting as only three28
fifths of a person. Such arguments also show the length to which
originalism can be stretched. Bork contends that the flexibility and
apparently infinite scope of originalism can be limited by finding
the intent of the founders at a required level of generality and then
29
requiring consistent application. But it is up to the interpreter,
30
presumably a judge, to choose the proper level of generality.
Originalism represents the most dangerous kind of
interpretation. It invokes popular support by claiming to embrace
aspects of the founders’ agreement while falsely purporting to be
31
applied in a consistent manner. At the same time, the originalist
method is so flexible that judges can use it to fulfill their whims and
political ideology. It is hard to imagine anything less likely to
the tyranny of the majority, Dworkin generates a principle that forbids “appealing
to the majority preferences about . . . what sort of lives their fellow citizens should
lead.” Id. at 68. He applies this principle to conclude that the Constitution
forbids laws that discriminate against homosexuals, calling it an “application of
original intent.” Id.
26. BORK, supra note 21, at 30–31.
27. Id.
28. Bernard Schwartz details the extremely tenuous rationalization needed
for Bork and Meese to reconcile the views of the founders with contemporary
notions of racial equality. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 22–25.
29. BORK, supra note 2.
30. Consequently, we must ask, on what principle can we conclude that an
eighteenth-century white man would have believed that an abstract commitment
to equality somehow trumped everything he had learned about the inferiority of
other races, the need for slaves in the tobacco and cotton industries, or his own
economic concerns? And, on what principle of textual explication do we place a
vague principle, perhaps dimly glimpsed in letters or editorials, above specific
textual examples of inequality?
31. Research indicates that jurists who embrace the doctrine are hardly
consistent in their application of it. See generally Jason Czarnezki & William K.
Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65
MD. L. REV. 841 (2006); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002); Phelps & Gates, supra note 6; Joshua
Ferguson et al., Behind the Mask of Method (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 41, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=800833.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 1
5. LERMACK - RC.DOC

1410

4/23/2007 10:52:09 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

protect us from the abuses of judicial supremacy.
Originalism should be rejected as an interpretive method not
merely because it is impractical and will lead to bad public policy
but simply because it is wrong. It is inconsistent with the
government that the Constitution creates. It rests on a false
analogy, a metaphor pushed too far. The next section of this
Article will investigate the nature of social contracts and the extent
32
to which the Constitution can be categorized as a social contract.
The following sections will examine what our political ancestors
33
thought they were doing as they created the Constitution and the
ways that the Constitution has been used in the years since its
34
ratification. Finally, it will be argued that originalism does not
35
provide a suitable method for understanding the Constitution.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
The social contract is a metaphor. It solidifies the important
principle that governmental power comes from the people and
rests on the consent of the governed. It leads to the important
normative conclusion that because the people have given their
consent to the existence and powers of the government, they have
also created an obligation to obey it. Political obligation, like a
contractual obligation, is grounded in the promise to keep one’s
word, to live up to the deals that were consented to, and to follow
the accepted order of society.
A. The Social Contract of Thomas Hobbes
The central and defining moment for social contracts in
modern history occurred in 1651 when Thomas Hobbes published
36
his Leviathan.
In a single, vivid piece of work, Leviathan
32. See infra Parts II, IV.A.3.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Parts IV.B.2, V.
36. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1985)
(1651). Scholars have traced the roots of the social contract back to antiquity and
to biblical notions of covenant. Sir Ernest Barker found ideas of the social
contract in Plato’s Athens and during the Middle Ages. Ernest Barker, Introduction
to JOHN LOCKE, DAVID HUME & J. J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT vii–xliv (Ernest
Barker ed., Oxford University Press 1947) [hereinafter Barker Introduction]. The
social contract was also a central figure of Richard Hooker’s 1594 text, The Laws of
Ecclesiastical Polity. See GEORGE H. SABINE & THOMAS L. THORSON, A HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THEORY 408 (Hinsdale ed., Dryden Press 4th ed. 1973).
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summarized previously published ideas about political obligation.
The then-prevailing theories contended that people were obliged
to obey the government because it was God’s will for the ruler to
37
rule or because the ruler was viewed as having the same level of
38
The
authority over society as a patriarch had over his family.
chaos and regime changes produced by the English civil wars,
however, had made thoughtful people question the existing bases
for political obligation.
Thomas Hobbes provided an alternate basis for the public’s
compulsion to obey the government beyond mere moral
39
obligation.
He offered a series of deductions based on the
assumption that all people, at all times, are motivated by the same
40
small number of drives, urges, and needs.
When life is
41
threatened, self-preservation is the strongest of motivations.
Indeed, Hobbes argued that this interest cannot be trumped by any
42
other obligation.
Short of a life-threatening situation, the
strongest drive is the personal desire to exercise freedom of
43
motion. In Hobbes’ colorful language, people are said to have an
“appetite” to seek “delight” through movement, exertion and
44
acquisition. In a natural state, without government or any other
social organization, this movement inevitably brought each person
into conflict with others who were similarly motivated. Each person
could respond violently to the attempts of others to place barriers
on their freedom of movement, causing life in this natural state to
37. See generally MULFORD SIBLEY, POLITICAL IDEAS AND IDEOLOGIES:
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 316–17, 345, 372 (1970).

A HISTORY

38. This was the position of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia, which John Locke
ridiculed and demolished in his Treatises on Government, but it was also the position
of Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la Republique, which remains plausible and influential.
See SABINE & THORSON, supra note 36, at 374–79 (1973).
39. When Hobbes based political obligation on the social contract, people
who were used to relying on a divinely inspired moral obligation as the basis for
compliance had no choice but to consider the now-commonplace idea that power
comes from the people themselves. Leviathan was widely read and it continues to
fascinate because it proposed the idea, now universally accepted, that the
government must be based on the consent of the governed. See generally SIBLEY,
supra note 37, at 292–93.
40. See HOBBES, supra note 36, at 81–83. But see LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND ITS GENESIS 151 (1963).
41. “A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save
himselfe from death . . . .” HOBBES, supra note 36, at 199.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 118–30.
44. Id.
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be characterized as “the warre . . . of every man, against every
45
man.” Life, in the natural state, would be “solitary, poore, nasty,
46
brutish and short.” It is the worst state of existence imaginable.
According to Hobbes, the drive for freedom yields at that
47
point to the stronger drive for self-preservation. To end the war
of “every man against every man,” people agreed to create an
48
organization that could use compulsion to end the violence.
Hobbes defines this social contract:
I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this
Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give
up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one
Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine,
CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that great
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that
Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God our
49
peace and defence.
This agreement creates a sovereign, but the sovereign is not a party
to the agreement. It owes the citizens nothing. The sovereign’s
interest, however, like those agreeing to be bound, lies in
50
preserving order and avoiding life-threatening violence.
The sovereign can be expected to use the obedience of its
subjects to stamp out any threat of violence or disorder. It could
issue draconian edicts coupled with brutal punishments to ensure
51
compliance. By the terms of the agreement, the subjects are not
only required to enforce these edicts, but it is in their interests to
do so. If an individual’s resistance is not punished it could lead to
group rebellion. If rebellion shakes the sovereign’s power, it
threatens to propel the whole population back into the violent,
natural state.
Hobbes offers little evidence. He only “models.” From simple
45. Id. at 185.
46. Id. at 186.
47. Id. at 225–26.
48. Id. at 226–27.
49. Id. at 227.
50. See generally Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1211, 1227 (2006).
51. In a Hobbesian state, the torturer will be efficient and the executioner
zealous. See José Brunner, Modern Times: Law, Temporality and Happiness in Hobbes,
Locke and Bentham, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW, 2007, at 277, 282 (stating the
belief uniformly held by Hobbes, Locke, and Benthan that the sovereign holds
power over individuals based on its ability to instill the fear of punishment).
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premises about human nature, he deduces that certain human
responses are necessary and automatic. The result is a bare
schematic drawing. The actors are one-dimensional, motivations
are limited to a few hierarchical drives, and society consists only of
the relations between the individuals and the sovereign, free from
other human relationships including family, church, and voluntary
organizations. The sovereign gives orders and the subjects obey.
No emotions of kindness or compassion are strong enough to
overcome the drive for self-preservation that is embodied by the
state.
B. John Locke’s Natural Law and the Social Contract
52

John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government is best viewed as a
parallel theory meant to modify Hobbes’ model. Locke offers a set
of deductions, which reach a more benign conclusion about society
because they are based on a more benign set of assumptions about
the people who comprise it. Locke relaxed the rigid assumption
that the strength of human instinct prevents the person within its
53
grip from fighting against it. Locke further argued that people
were compassionate, sociable, and could see the dangers of
54
unchecked conflict.
People are capable of perceiving and being guided by natural
55
law. To Locke, natural law guarantees a bundle of inalienable
56
rights, chiefly the right to acquire property. It also presents a set
of normative prescriptions designed to maintain order and
harmony, which is in everyone’s long-term interest. Under natural
law, people will order their behavior to avoid the destructive
conflict that Hobbes thought was inevitable. If some individual
threatened the peace, the others would enforce it, for “every man
has a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of
57
nature.”
Thus, the natural state would not be brutish or
inherently unpleasant. Nevertheless, it remains far from ideal.
The natural state is marred by certain practical limitations.
Impartial judges would not be available to adjudicate the inevitable
52. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
Arts Press 1952) (1690).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8.
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property conflicts. Ad hoc efforts to resolve these problems or acts
of vigilantism do not provide an efficient response or alternative to
governance. People, therefore, create government by agreeing to
obey a sovereign. They give up their power to privately punish
violators of natural law. But that is all they give up. People cannot
bargain away their natural rights.
Indeed, the purpose of
58
government is to protect these rights.
The social contract, therefore, creates only a limited obligation
to obey. As long as the sovereign governs in accordance with
natural law, people must accept governmental action. If the
sovereign violates natural law, people are relieved of the obligation
of obedience. Indeed, Locke argued that people possess a natural
59
right to rebel against a tyrannical government.
Locke’s
conclusions allowed the social contract to evolve and become
associated with rights, limits on government, and the sense that the
government may use brute force only in an exercise to achieve what
60
is right and just. Locke turned the social contract into a powerful
means of legitimizing the government. Government must serve the
people, so we are obliged to obey it. If government does not serve
the people, we can rebel. The fact that we are not rebelling
becomes evidence that the government has not become abusive.
Eighteenth-century America was strongly influenced by
61
Locke.
The theory advanced by Locke’s Second Treatise on
Government “was commonplace doctrine, everywhere to be met
62
with.”
Thomas Jefferson asserted that Locke’s arguments were
“expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the
63
elementary books of public right.” Along with Whig and Classical
ideas about republican citizenship, Locke’s commentary was the
64
intellectual furniture available to the founding generation.
58. Id. at 70–72.
59. Id. at 123–25.
60. See Barker, supra note 36, at viii. To the extent that all people have the
same natural rights, social contract theory has also been used to justify the
important principle of equality. See RON REPLOGLE, RECOVERING THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 4 (1989).
61. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 5–6
(1955); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA (1995).
62. CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY ON THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 79 (Vintage Books ed., 1970) (1922).
63. Id.
64. The prevailing view of contemporary historians is that although
numerous concepts of what a republic should be like were circulating at the time
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C. The Social Contract of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, including The Social
Contract, are perhaps best remembered for rhapsodizing on the
65
nobility of people living in a pastoral state of nature. Though
Native Americans possessed very sophisticated governments of their
own and were not living in a purely natural state, they fascinated
66
the colonists who came to think of them as noble savages.
Rousseau saw the natural state and their presence within it as
67
unstable and incomplete.
Though compassionate, people in a natural state could only
68
pursue their own goals. They could not aid one another or even
socialize because there was no society to create rules of
69
socialization. Rousseau argued that the “noble savages” felt this
70
71
lack. They yearned for society. They, therefore, created it, with
each person giving up virtually all their natural rights to others.
In this self-created society, each person retains only the right
to equally participate in the making of necessary community
72
decisions. For Rousseau, this participation is properly limited to
helping the community discover, in each case, the one course of

of the Revolution, these were all generally compatible in their insistence on
limited government and participation. See Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology
Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 1
(1986); Kramnick, supra note 9, at 3–32.
65. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, DAVID HUME & J.J. ROUSSEAU, in SOCIAL CONTRACT
(1947).
66. The portraits drawn by George Catlin and the descriptions of Native
American customs offered by such diverse writers as James Fenimore Cooper and
Francis Parkman illustrate America’s fascination with the vanishing Native
American populations in the nineteenth century. National Gallery of Art, http://
www.nga.gov/kids/catlin/catlin1.html (George Caitlin) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007);
American Studies, University of Virginia, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/
HNS/Indians/cooper.html (James Fenimore Cooper) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007);
American Studies, University of Virginia, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/
HNS/Indians/parkman.html (Francis Parkman) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
67. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 199–234 (E. P. Dutton & Co. ed., G. D. H. Cole
trans., 1950) (1974).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Rousseau discusses human nature and the need for society most
extensively in the first part of A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. See id. at 177206.
71. Id.
72. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES 13, 13–16, supra note 67.
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73

action that benefits the best interests of everyone in the long run.
To this general will, each citizen must sacrifice his own short-term
74
interests and desires. Citizenship, therefore, requires a type of
self-abnegation that is not called for in the natural state. The act of
creating and maintaining a civilized society creates citizens out of
mere individuals.
The sovereign in each community consisted of nothing more
than citizens making important policy decisions. Functionally, the
sovereign consisted only of “us,” and there is no entity capable of
exacting tyranny from which the people needed to be protected.
Consequently, neither limits on governmental powers nor
guarantees of rights are found in Rousseau’s system.
Americans have never found Rousseau’s views on government
congenial. They tend to think of his descriptions of personal
participation in small communities as sentimental at best, and at
75
worst, as encouraging totalitarianism.
Nevertheless, Rousseau’s
acknowledgement of our natural inclination to be sociable and
people’s ability to be transformed by social deeds is extremely
insightful. It insists that citizens can be shaped by public work.
From this type of public or social work, the founding generation
created the Constitution, as well as the identity of Americans and
America as a nation.
III. FOUNDING DOCUMENTS
The belief that the founders were responsible for creating
something new and essentially different is a key part of the
American colonial experience. A new society was coming into
being. As the colonials moved throughout North America, which
they saw as wilderness, they occasionally found themselves beyond
the reach of familiar civil institutions. In such cases, they came to
think of themselves as being in a state of nature.
As late as 1777, settlers in a then-isolated Vermont declared
their independence from the organized colonies of New
76
Hampshire. In language clearly echoing Thomas Jefferson’s more
73. Id.
74. Id. Rousseau postulates that this general will always exists. Id.
75. The debate over Rousseau’s compatibility with totalitarianism is
summarized by R.A. LEIGH, Liberty and Authority in On Social Contract, in
ROUSSEAU’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 232–44 (Alan Ritter & Julia Conway Bondanella
eds., 1988) (1762).
76. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 32–33 (1988)
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famous declaration, the settlers proclaimed, we “are at present
without law or government, and may be truly said to be in a state of
nature; consequently a right remains to the people of said Grants
to form a government best suited to secure their property, well
77
being and happiness.”
The model for this claim, predating
78
Locke, was the Mayflower Compact.
A. The Mayflower Compact
Finding themselves on a ship beyond the reach of British
authority, the Pilgrims looked into the face of the state of nature
79
They believed that government was necessary to
and recoiled.
keep people from yielding to the depravity in their nature, and
they knew that they would need leadership to deal with the harsh
winter ahead. On November 21, 1620, the Pilgrims formed
themselves into a “civill body politick” and drafted a written
80
They promised to obey civil officials when they
agreement.
enforced “such just and equal lawes, ordinances . . . as shall be
thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the
colony, unto which we promise all due submission and
81
obedience.”
Significantly, the brief document does not detail the specifics
of the government it created. To the extent that the Mayflower
Compact reveals the signers’ expectation that magistrates would
82
govern justly and “for our better ordering and preservation,” the
Mayflower Compact anticipates the limited agreements of Locke.
The Mayflower Compact, however, is an open-ended foundation
83
covenant without explicit limits or a written bill of rights, and it is
more Hobbesian than the documents that followed.
(quoting the settlers).
77. Id.
78. WILLIAM BRADFORD, MAYFLOWER COMPACT (1620).
79. Locke noted that history recorded many instances of people renouncing
allegiance to an existing civil society and founding a new one from scratch.
LOCKE, supra note 52, at 66. He saw the phenomenon as evidence that obligation
is not eternal or perpetual, but based on contract. Id.
80. ANDREW M. SCOTT, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 7 (1959) (quoting
BRADFORD, supra note 78).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Contractual or covenant ideas pervaded the Puritan social thought of
1701, which in turn served as a “seedbed” for many American ideas of liberty and
democracy. John Witte, Covenant Liberty in Puritan New England, in JURISPRUDENCE,
POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY (Frederick S. Carney et al. eds., 2004).
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B. Colonial Charters
New governmental ventures customarily began with written
authorizing documents. Colonial charters served as grants of
authority for the erection of governments and the foundation for
84
institutions and written laws. The most famous of these charters,
William Penn’s 1681 Charter for Pennsylvania, set rough
boundaries authorizing the proprietor to transport colonists and to
85
lay out towns and counties.
The proprietor was authorized to
appoint judges and other necessary officials to enforce criminal
justice in all but the most serious cases and to make laws consistent
with reason and not inconsistent with the laws of England, but only
after gaining the “advice, assent and approbation of the Freemen”
86
in a legislature.
Charters were issued unilaterally by the Royal Crown and
87
They
could be, and frequently were, altered in the same way.
were scarcely negotiated. Colonists, however, gained bargaining
power as it became clear that the King needed them. Only they
could transform the unproductive wilderness into orderly, taxpaying communities. It was customary, therefore, for the charters
88
to provide for limited self-government. At a minimum, colonies
89
would have legislatures elected by freeholders. Later, an explicit
bill of rights was added to some charters. Pennsylvania’s Charter of
Privileges guaranteed the freedom to participate in an elected
legislature to all Christians who were living peaceably in the colony
and guaranteed persons accused of crimes the right to trials in the
“ordinary course of justice,” including the same “Privileges of
90
Witness and Council as their Prosecutors.”
As the colonists saw it, the benefit of their obedience,
84. See generally, The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
states/statech.htm.
85. Pa. State Archives, The Charter to William Penn, March 4, 1681,
http://www.docheritage.state.pa.us/documents/charter.asp.
86. Id.; see also CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA (1861), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa01.htm.
87. In comparison, the colonists of Connecticut seemed to have organized
themselves into a body politic first and then petitioned for a charter. The Avalon
Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ct03.htm (including the
Charter of Connecticut, 1662) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
88. See, e.g., CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 86.
89. See id.
90. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED BY WILLIAM PENN, ESQ. TO THE
INHABITANTS OF PENNSYLVANIA AND TERRITORIES, OCTOBER 28, 1701, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa07.htm.
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diligence, and hard work was that the King would leave them alone
to govern their internal affairs. Many of the grievances listed in the
1776 Declaration of Independence were violations of rights
91
ostensibly guaranteed by the charters. The King was accused of
dissolving representative assemblies when they disagreed with him,
making them meet in inconvenient places, refusing to allow
properly made laws to go into effect, and subjecting them to
appointed civil and military authorities whose jurisdiction was
92
“foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws.”
The King was accused, in effect, of violating a contract implied by
the charters. He made himself a tyrant by “taking away our
Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering
93
fundamentally the Forms of our Government.”
C. State Constitutions
After the Declaration of Independence, many states revised or
rewrote their charters into true constitutions. These were often
explicitly Lockean in their language. For example, a 1780 draft
composed by John Adams for Massachusetts stated:
The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of
individuals. It is a social compact by which the whole
people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain
laws for the common good. It is the duty of the people,
therefore, in framing a Constitution of Government, to
provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as
for an impartial interpretation and a faithful execution of
them, that every man may, at all times, find his security in
94
them.
Such state constitutions did not create government from a natural
state. Their most important function was to reauthorize existing
governments by stating that their authority came directly from the
people rather than the King. To this extent, we can think of the
state constitutions as authorizing documents.
State constitutions often added explicit blueprints for

91. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF, WEST NEW JERSEY, AGREED
UPON - 1676, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj05.htm
(providing an example of the rights created and guaranteed by colonial charters).
92. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
93. Id.
94. 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 237 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 1989).
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government institutions. These blueprints depict the state’s varied
choices, illustrating the overwhelming goal of limiting government
power and preventing tyranny. The “Plan or Frame for the
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania” was genuinely innovative,
95
though the structure it created was unwieldy. The freemen were
to elect a House of Representatives whose members would serve
96
two-year terms and were subject to term limits.
An executive
council would be chosen to represent the counties, and the terms
97
of its members were to be staggered. Each year, the legislature
and the executive council together would choose a president and a
vice president, with the former exercising the enumerated powers
98
of the governor with the assistance of the committee. The natural
tendency was to rotate the presidency among the members of the
99
committee, which would also rotate it among the counties. The
council could outvote its president and thus control any descent
100
into tyranny.
South Carolina’s Constitutional Convention constituted itself
101
as a legislature.
The General Assembly authorized the election
from among its members of an upper house called the legislative
council and authorized the council to elect a president and vice
president who would have the powers formerly exercised by the
102
royal governors.
No separation of powers was provided. The
legislature could politically control any president. In contrast, the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 anticipated the United States
Constitution, expecting safety to come from a conventional
separation of powers and a careful enumeration of the powers of
103
each branch, especially the executive.
104
In addition to the listing of powers and prohibitions, all the
95. America’s History in the Making, Original State Constitution for Virginia and
Pennsylvania, http://www.learner.org/channel/courses/amerhistory/resource_ar
chive/resource.php?unitChoice=4&ThemeNum=3&resourceType=2&resourceID=
10081.
96. PA. CONST. (1776), available at http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/
pa08.
97. Id. § 11.
98. Id. § 19.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. S.C. CONST. arts. II, III (1776), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/sc01.htm.
102. Id.
103. See 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 94, at 237–61.
104. Substantive provisions may also be placed in state constitutions in the
form of limitations on powers. Many states have limitations on taxation. E.g., CAL.
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state constitutions from this period provide a bill of rights. These
were frequently lengthy and elaborate. In fact, all the provisions of
the 1791 federal Bill of Rights are anticipated in one or another of
106
the state drafts.
We can infer from the length of these
documents, and from the fact that they are usually placed at the
beginning of the state constitutions, that the protection of
107
individual rights was a primary purpose of the government.
These state constitutions served as a blueprint for the objectives of
the newly created government, the means by which officials would
be selected, and the limitations on their powers. When these
details are added to the explicit authorizations, we can best
describe the new state constitutions as founding or foundational
documents.
D. The Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation served as a founding document,
differing from the others only in that its authority came from the
108
states by delegation, rather than from the people directly.
The
national government it created was only to have necessary powers,
which were to be understood as those powers that the states were
willing to give up. Though this national government was capable of
certain achievements, it proved inadequate for the defense,
109
economic, and regulatory challenges of the 1780s.

CONST. art. XIIIA; ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3. These resemble the provisions in
Article 1 of the United States Constitution forbidding taxes on exports and
requiring direct taxes to be apportioned among the states. U.S. CONST. art I.
Maryland still forbids persons who belong to subversive organizations from
holding any office or position of trust in state or local governments. MD. CONST.
art. XV, § 3. Several states now forbid recognition within the state of any marriage
except those contracted between one man and one woman. E.g., KAN. CONST. art.
XV, §16; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. Kansas long ago forbid the existence within the
state of any lotteries. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 3. Various pro-gambling
constituencies, however, have developed within the state. Id. § 3A. (amending
state constitution to permit bingo); Id. § 3B (allowing horse and dog racing); Id.
§ 3C (permitting a state-run lottery).
105. ELAZAR, supra note 76, at 111–12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (1777), available at http://www.us
constitution.net/articles.html.
109. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1964);
FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–90, at 7 (1975); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION
(1966).
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E. The United States Constitution
The 1787 Constitutional Convention was convened to explore
ways to fix the defects that had become apparent in the Articles of
110
Confederation.
Delegates revisited principles, discussing what
111
they knew of the history of republican institutions in the context
of what they had learned from Hobbes and Locke. Then, the
delegates made congress bicameral and strengthened its military
and regulatory powers as part of an extensive list of enumerated
powers; created an independent executive who could respond to
emergencies quickly and who possessed significant military power;
112
and provided for an independent judiciary.
The United States Constitution, drafted by the Convention, is
extremely specific on details relating to the qualifications of
officeholders, selection methods, powers, and procedures. The
delegates wrangled, in committees and on the floor, over the
113
length of the President’s term, as well as the length and rotation
114
George Washington, the elected
period of a senator’s term.
presiding officer, spoke from the floor only once during the
115
Convention.
He gave his opinion on the hotly debated
116
As to
representation formula for the House of Representatives.
the legislators, the eventual draft is extremely specific, imposing
117
age and residency requirements,
identifying and sometimes
118
and
limiting the legislature’s power to choose its leaders,
delineating quorum requirements, internal disciplinary powers,
and lawmaking procedure including “presentment” to the
119
120
executive.
All of these details were debated.
Each provision
110. For a general discussion of the Constitutional Convention, see ROSSITER,
supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97, 134, 493, 497
(Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911).
114. 1 id. at 23; 1 id. at 64, 289.
115. 2 id. at 97, 134, 493, 497.
116. 2 id. at 643–44. A more comprehensive description of the issue is found
in a document by James Wilson, 3 id at 159–60.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
118. Id.
119. Id. art I.
120. E.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 113,
at 140, 155, 156, 245, 567, 592, 611 (on expulsion of members of congress); 2 id. at
158, 231 (on choosing a speaker); Id. at 21 (on bill-passing procedures); 2 id. at
181, 200, 298–302, 585–587 (on presentment). The requirement that legislators
be paid is part of the initial Virginia scheme. But see 1 id. at 20. Other innovations

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss4/1

20

Lermack: The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It Must Be a Contract
5. LERMACK - RC.DOC

2007]

4/23/2007 10:52:09 AM

ORIGINALISM AS INTERPRETIVE METHOD

1423

was the product of thought and reflection. Not a single procedural
clause was adopted casually.
Even more significant than the details governing each branch
is the structure of the edifice as a whole. All of the institutions are
limited. Government power comes from “we the people” who
retain the Lockean right to take it back. Each institution can
exercise only its few enumerated powers, and each must obey
various explicit limits. The national government was created to
establish a balance of power among the executive, legislative, and
judicial components, which would politically limit their ability to
oppress the people. The Constitution includes other powercontrolling balances as well. For example, within the legislature,
121
there are two equal Houses, which must agree.
Individual rights, perhaps neglected in the 1787 draft, were
122
added in near-absolute form in the Bill of Rights.
The
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, added in 1791, are either limiting
123
Political rights are expressed
or absolute substantive provisions.
124
as limits on the kinds of laws congress can create.
For example,
the First Amendment declares, “Congress shall make no law . . .
125
Substantive
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
clauses were partially included to meet political objections of
groups whose opposition could imperil ratification. Such details as
126
the eminent domain clause, the protection of property under the
127
128
due process clause, the right to hire counsel in criminal cases,
129
and even the protection of a free press probably respond to the

were considered and rejected. 2 id. at 97, 102, 134 (term limits for the president);
1 id. at 20 (term limits for the House of Representatives and recall of house
members).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
122. Id. amends. I–X. Cf. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, in GARY L.
MCDOWELL, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 253, 254 (1981). Slavery was
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Other
substantive provisions have been added in the years since, the best known being
the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of citizenship and the Eighteenth
Amendment’s imposition of prohibition on alcoholic beverages. Id. amends. XIV,
XVIII.
123. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
124. The rights of criminally accused persons and the eminent domain clause,
however, are expressed in positive language. See id. amends. V, VI.
125. Id. amend. I.
126. Id. amend V.
127. Id.
128. Id. amend VI.
129. Id. amend. I.
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concerns of the affluent.
As the delegates debated, their conflicting substantive
130
131
concerns were often remedied by structural responses.
This is
certainly true of the Constitution’s most explicit substantive
concern, the protection of slavery. The Constitution gave state
legislators tools that they could use to prevent congressional
132
interference with slavery. The three-fifths compromise,
the
133
fugitive slave clause, and the ban on ending the importation of
134
slaves before the year 1808 are the most unambiguous provisions
in the Constitution. Only here does substance takes priority.
The Constitution was innovative and controversial. The
ratification process was deliberately designed to encourage
130. Only a few clauses of the draft dealt with substantive details of public
policy. Aware of the historical abuses of the law of treason in Europe to suppress
political dissent or seize the property of the wealthy, the drafters defined treason
very narrowly and required restrictive court procedures to prove it. See id. art. III,
§ 3. The new government was responsible for the existing public debt and allaying
the fears of bondholders and of state governments that Revolutionary War debt
might be repudiated. See id. art. VI, cl. 1. Additionally, both the nation and the
states are forbidden to interfere with the obligation of contracts. Id. art. I, §§ 9–10
(prohibiting ex post facto laws under Section 9 applying to the federal
government provision and barring congressional authority to impair contracts at
the state government level under Section 10).
131. Nearly half of the articles contained in The Federalist justify a structural
feature of the proposed government. HAMILTON ET AL, supra note 9. Six articles
discuss the federal balance, confronting objections to lodging some powers in the
federal government or to limiting it in some respect. THE FEDERALIST No. 41
(James Madison). Thirty articles justify such structural features as the separation
of powers, checks and balances, the ratio of representatives to citizens,
qualifications required of representatives and the President, the novel method of
choosing the President, the absence of term limits for the President, and the
independence of the judiciary. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41–58 & 62–63 (James
Madison), Nos. 59–61, 65–73, 78–79 & 82 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 64 (John
Jay). When the authors discuss substantive concerns, their arguments often revert
to questions of structure or procedure. James Madison’s tenth essay is well known
for decrying the “violence of faction.” THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
The political parties of Madison’s day were small groups of influential persons,
including representatives, united in supporting some course of action not
necessarily in the public interest. If such a group could control a legislature, it
would raise significant danger of tyranny. Madison’s essay warned against this
danger. It also argued that the remedy was already at hand in the structure of the
proposed government. Id. Madison argued that factions would not be able to
work their mischief if there was just the right number of public-spirited
representatives to oppose them. Id. The cure for the violence of factions,
therefore, rested in the ratio of representation. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3
(setting a maximum number of representatives at one per thirty thousand).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
133. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
134. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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participation and to make the consent of the governed overt and
135
People debated and discussed the draft at great
explicit.
136
length.
Referring to the constant conversation overheard in
public places, Richard Butler wrote that “[t]he new Constitution
for the United States seems now to engross the attention of all
137
ranks.”
The memory of these public discussions quickly became the
founding story of the new nation. Indeed, if the Constitution is
considered a national founding document, then the period of
debate from 1787 to 1789 can be described as a founding moment.
The Constitution is, in a sense, testimony to the fact that our
country once did something as “The People.” “[W]e are a people
who constitute ourselves as a people in and through the terms of a
138
fundamental text.”
Not long after ratification, politicians were talking about our
139
sacred Constitution.
It came to be an American symbol, like the
140
American eagle or flag. It has become a repository of our ideals.
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan explained, “The
Constitution embodies the aspiration to social justice,
brotherhood, and human dignity that brought this nation into
being . . . . [W]e are an aspiring people, a people with faith in
progress. Our amended Constitution is the lodestar for our
141
aspirations.”
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

People do not always agree on what the Constitution means or,
135. See id. art. VII.
136. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 57–98
(2006).
137. Letter from Richard Butler to William Irvine (Oct. 11, 1787), in
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 177, supra
note 9.
138. GOLDFORD, supra note 22, at 16–17 (2005). It is in this sense that James
Madison called the Constitution “the cement of the union.” MICHAEL KAMMEN, A
MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 61
(1986).
139. ELAZAR, supra note 76, at 124–77.
140. Today we preserve a vellum copy of the Constitution, battered and
ancient, in the National Archives and Records Administration. The U.S.
Constitution Online, http://www.usconstitution.net/constpix.html#const (last
visited Apr. 3, 2007). It is displayed under climate-controlled conditions, and with
great security, like the irreplaceable bones of some saint.
141. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986).
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indeed, even understand what it says, but they generally agree that
the Constitution should be obeyed. A 1997 survey commissioned
by the National Constitution Center revealed that although
respondents knew little about the specific details of the
Constitution, “[t]he vast majority of Americans fe[lt] that the
Constitution is important to them, makes them proud, and is
142
relevant to their daily lives.” Policy advocates, therefore, want the
Constitution on their side. They explain and justify their policy
proposals in terms of what the Constitution allows or forbids, and
their supporters and opponents argue over whether they are
correct. In America, the phrase “popular constitutionalism” has a
143
tangible meaning.
As constitutional questions arise over congressional or private
actions, the courts make the final determination about what is
144
constitutionally permissible.
Judges are called upon to use some
interpretive method or principle independent of their own
145
political backgrounds, political goals, or personal preferences.
After all, the “[C]onstitution is not an instrument for the
146
realization of any political faction’s goals.”
Rather, it is “a set of
147
In
structures within which political factions can fairly compete.”
attempting to provide objective rulings and allow controversies to
be fairly adjudicated, judges are ultimately responsible for creating
142. THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION: MODERN INTERPRETATIONS 5 (2006);
see also National Constitution Center, http://www.constitutioncenter.org/
CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/NCCNationalPoll/TheAnswers.shtml
(last
visited Apr. 3, 2007) (containing archived survey data).
143. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
mainpages/curriculum/colloquium/Larry%20Kramer.pdf.
144. Tradition, springing from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803), reveals that it is the province and duty of judges to “say what the law is.”
When the Constitution becomes a source of litigation, it must be interpreted. Its
terms must be defined, implied powers must be inferred, and the language of the
eighteenth century must be related to situations, problems, and policy options of
today. This is a vast task for the judicial branch. Such judicial analysis inevitably
considers the Constitution as a source of law. Philip Bobbitt has argued that
“[e]veryone agrees the Constitution is law.” PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION xiv (1991); see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES
OF THE LAW 123–25 (Beacon Press, 1982) (1921) (explaining that it is up to judges
to give the Constitution legal effect). By its own terms, the Constitution is the
highest source of law, trumping federal legislation and state-made law including
state constitutions. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
145. Edwin Meese III, Politics and the Constitution, in POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTERPRETATION 53, 55 (1990).
146. Id. at 57.
147. Id.
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or choosing an interpretive model for understanding and applying
148
the Constitution.
A. Contractual Interpretation
Originalists claim that the Constitution is analogous to other
contracts. Consequently, they argue that the Constitution should
be interpreted in the same manner as other contracts:
[A] written constitution is like a trust agreement. It
specifies what powers the trustees are to have and it
endows these agents with certain authority delegated by
the settlor who created the trust. [I.e., the sovereign
public, which created and imposed limits on the
government.]
....
. . . Thus the methods hitherto used to construe deeds
and wills and contracts and promissory notes, methods
confined to the mundane subjects of the common law,
became the methods of constitutional construction once
149
the state itself was put under law.
Significantly, this is a lawyerly elaboration.
According to this argument, the Constitution is not just a deal
that people make with one another. Rather, it is analogous to a
highly formalized kind of deal, specifically the trust agreement.
The technical language of the law governs this form of agreement,
where the parties receive formal titles such as trustee or testator,
their intentions are reduced to boilerplate clauses with names, and
the rights and duties they create can be specifically delineated.
1.

Formal Contracts

Formal contracts are the kinds of contracts that lawyers are
familiar with. They are not ordinary agreements that people
merely make with one another on their own, but rather a small
fragment of agreements that become formalized when the parties
consult their lawyers. In shorthand, we can refer to these formal
148. A strong argument can be made, however, that any single interpretive
method will always be inadequate. Cf. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 11.
149. BOBBITT, supra note 144. Compare with the comments of Justice Antonin
Scalia in an address sponsored by the Federalist Society, “The Constitution is not a
living organism, it is a legal document. It says something and doesn’t say other
things.” Scalia Blasts Advocates of ‘Living Constitution,’ MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11346274.
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contracts as lawyers’ contracts. As sources of law, lawyers’ contracts
have certain features. They are made all at once, in a contractual
moment signifying agreement, and the agreement is reduced to
writing. They specify each party’s rights and duties in relation to
150
some promise or performance.
2.

Relational Contracts

Some formal contracts are relational. These contracts try to fix
the terms of some ongoing business relationship. Typically, they
try to preserve some mutually advantageous relationship into a
151
relatively predictable future. The Constitution is closest in nature
to relational contracts. Just as a relational contract attempts to
provide predictability into the future, the Constitution offered
stable guidance to an evolving nation.
By making relational contracts, a business tries to make some
ongoing activity reliable and controllable. For example, a box
manufacturing company can agree to deliver a certain gross of
boxes to a trinket factory each Monday morning. The trinket
maker can then be reasonably certain of having the packing
materials it needs to make its weekly shipments. In exchange, the
trinket maker agrees to pay the contract price on a regular basis.
In addition, the relational contract could provide for various
foreseeable future events by including contingent clauses. If the
trinket factory’s business increases, it can increase the number of
boxes in its standing order by providing two weeks notice.
Changing circumstances can be dealt with by various contract
clauses defining the appropriate kind of notice and response.
The very reason that the parties make any lawyers’ contract is
to project their intentions into the future. Thus, the appropriate
interpretive method is for the courts to enforce that original intent.
“The primary and overriding purpose of contract law is to ascertain
and give effect to the intentions of the parties, and the parties’
intent controls the interpretation of a contract as far as that may be

150. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 2 (1999) (describing legal characterizations of
contracts).
151. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (1980) (defining a
contract as “the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into
the future”). An employment contract is an example of a relational contract. In
an employment contract, the employee agrees to perform certain duties. In
exchange, the employer agrees to a certain salary and benefits. The contract often
anticipates a relationship of extended duration.
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done consistently with legal principles, statutes, good morals, or
152
Traditional contracts are lengthy and technical
public policy.”
because the lawyers who draft them believe that they have to sweat
the details in order to ensure that the intent of the maker is
properly captured. This has long been understood. In his 1833
commentary on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story explained,
“The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all
instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the
153
terms, and the intention of the parties.”
3.

The Constitution as a Contract

An analogy between contracts and social contracts may come
154
easily to lawyers, but it is clearly erroneous when applied to the
Constitution. The analogy trivializes the Constitution, the symbol
of our unity and the repository of our ideals, by reducing it to a
mere instrument. No one marches off to war or lays down their life
for a promissory note. It is even more demeaning to analogize the
founding of our nation, our transforming moment, to the creation
of a business contract intended only to insure dependable, future
profits.
The very language of a lawyer’s contract may not be
compatible with the expressions of the philosophers who gave us
155
our basic ideas about social contracts.
Hobbes, for example,
152. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 308 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
153. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii (3d ed.
1858). Indeed, interpretation may be defined as attempting to discern this
original intent. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1992).
154. Lawyers are tempted by the analogy because the word “contract” is used
in both cases. Also, legal education offers detailed descriptions about what
lawyers’ contracts must include. Significantly, Rousseau’s Contrat sociale ou Principes
du droit politique is conventionally translated as Social Contract, but one translator
translates the same term as Social Compact and another writes Social Pact. THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, supra note 72, at 13 (social compact); JeanJacques Rousseau, On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in ROUSSEAU’S
POLITICAL WRITINGS 84, 92 (1988) (social pact).
155. J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 5–6 (1936).
“[T]o express political obligation in the legal terminology of contract is
to use a legal analogy, and no doubt in some ways an unfortunate analogy
. . . . Many [social contract theorists] were not lawyers but men of letters,
or frankly pamphleteers, and we need not suppose that they always used
these terms in the strictest legal senses.”)
Id. Locke’s limited social contract would seem at first glance to be an exception.
His language is more legalistic than other social contract theorists. In various
places, he discusses such legal matters as wills and inheritances, and he often uses
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distinguished ordinary business contracts from what he explicitly
156
A contract is a “mutuall
referred to as compacts or pacts.
157
transferring of Right[s],” a reciprocal agreement to be bound.
Both sides agree to make a promise or perform some specified
action for their mutual benefit. The obligation is discharged when
158
all of those actions are performed.
In contrast, Hobbes’
compacts are perpetual and open-ended. The subject matter is
“alwayes something that falleth under deliberation . . . and is
159
therefore alwayes understood as something to come.” Thus, even
if people perform specified tasks, their obligation to obey the
sovereign remains.
The obligation devolves to future
160
generations.
In such cases, something is going on that is well
beyond the routine legal enforcement of lawyers’ contracts.
When we call popular sovereignty a social contract, “what we
really mean is not that political obligation implies a contract socalled, but that it involves a relationship which resembles or is
161
analogous to a contract in some respects but not in others.”
Some overriding power provided for in the compact is vested in the
162
deliberative and policymaking procedure of the sovereign.
The
legal metaphors. LOCKE, supra note 52. For example, when he discusses the ability
of a citizen to renounce obligation to a government by leaving its territory, he
analogizes this to abandoning real estate by sale or otherwise quitting it. Id. at 69.
But Locke’s language must be understood in the context of the late seventeenth
century. Locke’s intended audience used the word contract to refer to several
different kinds of documents. When Parliament accused King James II of
breaking the “original contract between king and people” by leaving the country
in 1688, it was referring to a tacit bargain more vague and open-ended than any
lawyer’s contract. See MARTYN P. THOMPSON, IDEAS OF CONTRACT IN THE AGE OF
JOHN LOCKE 12 (1987). Similarly, the period’s writers distinguished between
foundational contracts, moral contracts, and unbreakable, eternal “contracts
before god.” Id. at 40 (discussing the book ROBERT JENKIN, THE TITLE OF AN
USURPER (1690)). These are distinguishable from wills and promissory notes. In
context, Locke’s view of social contracts more closely resembles that of Hobbes. It
is similarly general, ongoing and open-ended.
156. HOBBES, supra note 36, at 192.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 193.
160. Id. The fact that the obligation to obey is thus handed down, “which
republican writers would never allow,” and persists even after regime changes have
obliterated the original sovereign, is the major flaw which David Hume used to
attack contract theory in 1752. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HUME:
THEORY OF POLITICS 193, 198 (1951).
161. GOUGH, supra note 155.
162. For Locke, this power is not absolute. As Thomas Jefferson understood
Locke, the power is very great and discretionary. Only if the sovereign commits
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compact imposes an ongoing obligation on behalf of the people
even as it disregards some of their substantive intent. The
compact’s lack of reciprocity in obligation makes it unlike an
ordinary contract. For the purpose of legal interpretation, the
social contract is simply not similar enough to the close-ended
lawyers’ contract.
Indeed, the varying perspectives of the constitutional
generation do not lend themselves to the close-ended nature of the
lawyers’ contract. The people who negotiated, drafted, and ratified
163
the Constitution had multiple policy goals.
Some wanted to
create a moral government, open to Christian religious influence;
others had visions of ideal societies based on manufacturing, or
even Biblical organizing principles; still, others sought the
protection and perfection of natural rights, or a Lockean
government in which the principles of the Declaration of
164
Independence would be worked out.
These goals, and others,
conflicted.
Moreover, to the extent that these were long-term goals, they
could not be realized by mere contract clauses. The solution
provided by a social compact was to create a government open to
influence where individuals could pursue these goals. Once
created, however, the government would be autonomous and not
under the control of the framers. Consequently, the framers paid
attention to the structure of government, trying to maximize
165
fairness and openness.
In this respect, contemporary state constitutions are typically,
markedly different.
They are rich sources of substantive
166
provisions.
Education is the most ubiquitous example. The
wholesale violations of natural rights are the people justified in disregarding that
prudence that makes it unwise to lightly dissolve the bonds of an established
society and in resorting to their right of revolution.
163. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (envisioning how a
constitutional convention might work when parties try to maximize the chances of
eventually reaching diverse and conflicting policy goals). Attempts have been
made to model the actual 1787 Convention. See, e.g., Robert A. McGuire & Robert
L. Ohsfeldt, An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 79, 79–111 (1986); William H.
Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments
on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1–16 (1984).
166. The substantive provisions of state constitutions range in purpose and
scope. For example, in Indiana, “the penal code shall be founded on the
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Constitution of Illinois says that “[t]he state shall provide for an
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions” that
167
shall be free to the students.
Other states have similar
168
provisions. California required the legislature to provide funding
for education in an amount not less than $180 per student each
169
year.
The state’s schools must also be open and funded for at
170
least six months per year.
Similarly, many states are constitutionally required to manage,
171
regulate, or conserve resources in the public interest.
Illinois
172
This may
mandates the maintenance of a healthy environment.
involve developing water resources in a controlled manner,
protecting waterways from exploitative forms of commercial
173
174
fishing, or instituting specific protections for hunting.
Public
175
utilities must also be managed.
These examples indicate the difference between constitutions
and contracts. The substantive provisions of the state constitutions
reflect public policy. Different constituencies are either benefited
or harmed by them, and they fight over them just as they fight over
ordinary legislative policy. Not surprisingly, state constitutions are
176
frequently tinkered with, amended, or rewritten entirely.
Alabama, for example, has had six constitutions since it became a
177
state.
Changes to constitutions are proposed by legislatures,
178
In many states, these
special convention, and lobbying efforts.
principles of reformation and not of vindictive justice.” IND. CONST. art. I, § 18.
Also, the Minnesota legislature is required to pay a bonus to veterans of the
Vietnam and first Persian Gulf conflicts. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 8.
167. ILL. CONST. art X, § 1.
168. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII pmbl § 1; MD. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1. Some require the state to provide free textbooks to the students. E.g.,
CAL. CONST. art IX, § 7.5 (for students in grades 1–8); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
169. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
170. Id. art. IX, § 5.
171. E.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2.
172. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
173. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XA, XB.
174. E.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
175. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII. Public utility management may be seen to
include railroads. TEX. CONST. art. X, § 2.
176. deTocqueville noted this tendency as long ago as 1830.
ALEXIS
DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 249 (J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday 1975)
(1966).
177. An Overview of Alabama’s Six Constitutions, http://www.legislature.state.
al.us/misc/history/constitutions/constitutions.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
178. For example, the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970 has been
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efforts are part of the ordinary political process.
These
constitutions resemble relational contracts of medium-term
duration. By contrast, the United States Constitution has rarely
been amended, and any attempt to change the wording is met with
the attitude that it ought not be tinkered with lightly. The
government that it creates has endured longer than any such
government. Although it does things differently than it used to, its
structured provisions remain little changed.
Even if we were to read the Constitution as nothing more
than a promise that creates a legally enforceable obligation, it is
clear that the Constitution creates a much different kind of
obligation than is created by the ordinary lawyers’ contract. The
latter is an attempt to bring the future under the control of the
present, while the former is an arrangement to create a polity
179
capable of dealing with an evolving future.
B. Original Intent As An Interpretive Method
180

Originalists do not see this distinction.

Since the

extensively studied by political scientists. See generally IAN D. BURMAN, LOBBYING AT
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION (1970); ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER
FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (1980); SAMUEL W. WITWER, CON CON DIARY: REFLECTIONS OF SAMUEL
W. WITWER (1996). The delegates had to cope with high-pressure lobbying
campaigns by, among others, downstate banks who wanted to preserve
arrangements contained in the old Constitution that made it difficult for big-city
banks to establish branches in small towns. BURMAN, supra note 178. The most
effective lobbying was done by various elected and appointed public officials who
had varying goals but were typically well organized and wielded considerable
political power. Id.
179. WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 1 (1993) (stating
that the Constitution “narrates the polity into existence”). A polity, by its nature,
is the political expression and behavior of a group of people thus unified.
180. Robert Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 383, 385
(1985). Randy Barnett, who has probed the analogy most deeply, concedes its
limitations. Barnett, supra note 3, at 635. Barnett proposes a novel theory that
would justify at least limited originalism because he claims that it is the only
interpretive method that will do justice, which he defines as protecting those
natural rights that Locke argued people could not bargain away. Id. Such a
government would be perceived as just. Thus, people will accept it as legitimate.
Since the creation of a legitimate government is the overriding goal of the
Constitution, use of the originalist method maximizes the likelihood that the
Constitution will be successful.
Randy E. Barnett, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY iv, v (2003). Barnett does not argue
that judges must use originalism because the Constitution is a contract. He
cannot, however, entirely avoid reliance on the metaphor. In fact, Barnett has
argued that “something like a parol evidence rule is needed to preserve the
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Constitution requires proper, legal interpretation, they make the
ratifiers of the Constitution and the newly created government the
two parties to the Constitution’s agreement. Fidelity to the original
intent becomes the touchstone of all constitutional legitimacy.
Former Attorney General Ed Meese III stated, “The Constitution
represents the consent of the governed to the structures and
powers of the government. The Constitution is the fundamental
will of the people; that is the reason the Constitution is the
181
fundamental law.”
To further clarify, “[i]f judges get their
authority from the Constitution, and the Constitution gets its
authority from the majority vote of the ratifiers, then the role of the
182
judge is to carry out the will of the ratifiers.”
1.

Framers’ Intent

The framers of the Constitution are often presumed to have
had specific intentions relevant to the substance of legal issues and
disputes arising long after ratification. In this respect, David
Steinberg explored the roots of the Fourth Amendment. He
concludes that the Fourth Amendment was intended to focus
strongly, if not solely, on searches of residences and real estate
183
generally. This is the “original public meaning” originalism. To
support this conclusion, Steinberg relies on several historical
arguments. Initially, when members of Congress debated the text
of the Fourth Amendment, their language gradually narrowed to
184
focus on real estate. Additionally, a study of early analogous state
185
law reveals a focus on residences. Although Steinberg stops short
original meaning of the writing and enable it to fulfill the . . . clarification functions
of formality.” Barnett, supra note 3, at 630–31.
181. Ed Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986).
182. Farber, supra note 12. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
explained:
[T]here really is nothing else . . . . The Constitution should be read like
any other statute . . . . You either tell your judges, “Look, this is a law like
all laws. Give it the meaning it had when it was adopted.” Or you tell
your judges, “Govern us . . . . You make these decisions for us.”
Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40 (quoting
Justice Scalia).
183. David Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2004).
184. Id. at 1064–68. Steinberg also argues that the British law of the period,
including the controversies over John Wilkes’s case and the use of writs of
assistance, focused on searches of residences. Id.
185. Id.
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of concluding that all cases applying the Fourth Amendment
beyond residential searches are wrongly decided, he does argue
that contemporary search and seizure doctrine is “incoherent”
because courts have improperly stretched the boundaries of the
186
Fourth Amendment. He further comments, “Justices may restore
sensibility to Fourth Amendment analysis only by returning to the
187
original understanding of the amendment.”
Rigorous adherence to this kind of analysis has fixed some
policy preferences of the past eternally on the present. For
example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in “suits at common law”
applies to “the kinds of cases that ‘existed under the English
common law when the amendment was adopted,’” or to “newly
developed rights that can be analogized to what existed at that
188
time.”
But even a civil litigant’s right to a jury is not guaranteed
“if one cannot find eighteenth century precedent for jury
189
Some scholarly disputes exist
participation” in analogous cases.
over the historical basis for this ruling, but they do not critique the
190
originalist approach.
Freezing the right to a jury trial, as it was defined in 1791, fixes
191
the dead hand of the past on the living.
This emphasis on legal
history and the insistence that present-day legal issues can be
resolved based on ratification-era thought is characteristic of the
originalist approach. It makes sense only on the assumption that
the framers were wise enough to foresee and preemptively respond
to problems that would surface today.
If the job of a judge is to find and to give effect to the intent of the
contracting parties, then good judges do so faithfully and bad
judges do not. “When [the Constitution’s] intent and meaning is
discovered,” then “nothing remains but to execute the will of those
who made it, in the best manner to effect the purposes
192
intended.”
In Sober as a Judge: The Supreme Court and Republican
186. Id. at 1077–79, 1083.
187. Id. at 1096.
188. Meese III et al. eds., supra note 2.
189. Id.
190. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedures and the
English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 690–91 (2004); see also Suja A. Thomas,
Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 1 (2006).
191. Brigham, supra note 3, at 13.
192. SOBER AS A JUDGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (Richard
G. Stevens & Mathew Frank eds., 1999) (hereinafter “SOBER AS A JUDGE”). The
editors take their text from Justice William Johnson’s concurring opinion in
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Liberty, the authors use the terms “restrained” and “sober” to refer
to those Supreme Court Justices who ignored their own policy
preferences and instead attempted to give effect to the original
193
194
intent of the parties.
The list of “sober” judges gives praise to
those who think that fidelity to original intent takes precedence
over a display of initiative, imagination, and independent
intelligence that the judge might otherwise display. Notably, the
list excludes legal visionaries including Brennan the civil
libertarian, republican-minded Holmes, or even the lawyerly and
property-minded Taft.
2.

Rejecting the Originalist Interpretation

An originalist might respond that the inability to make the
contract analogy exact and the bad effects that follow from
applying originalism do not change the obligation to follow the
method. The Constitution, they might say, is a deal, an agreement
between governors and the governed. How else can a deal be
interpreted except by looking to specific intent? In fact, there are
certain types of deals that are judicially interpreted and applied by
courts with little, if any, attention to the specific intent of the
parties that made them. These deals are true civil contracts, not
necessarily akin to ordinary lawyers’ contracts. Perhaps the most
195
extreme example is the marriage contract.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
193. Id. at 20.
194. The list of “sober” judges excludes a series of concededly great legal
scholars. It also does not focus on courageous judges, like Marshall or Taney, who
took personal risks.
195. Marriage contracts are not the same as prenuptial agreements. See, e.g.,
Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 697, 698–702
(2001) (discussing the mechanics and policy of prenuptial agreements). Lawyers
draw up “prenups” to create a sphere of individual responsibility outside of a
marriage itself. Id. Prospective spouses can agree, for example, that each of them
will continue to be solely responsible for debts contracted before the marriage. Id.
Conversely, each can retain control of property acquired before the marriage. Id.
Personal property, they can agree, will not automatically convert into marital
property. Id.
A prenup can also provide for the orderly disposition of marital property
in case the marriage fails, and it can provide an orderly plan for such things as
alimony and child support that inevitably arise out of the detritus of a collapsed
marriage. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, in effect in many states, lists a
variety of property-related affairs about which prospective spouses may contract.
E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4 (1999 & Supp. 2006). These provisions
generally deal with the “rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the
property [possessed before the marriage] of either of them” and with advance
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A marriage contract is an agreement to create an association.
Though originally a religious ritual, marriage gradually became a
197
secular, civil arrangement. It is now recognized as a true contract
in which the parties agree to be bound and accept the legal
198
“Marriage is a
obligation to remain bound to one another.
personal relations[hip] arising out of a civil contract between a
man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of
199
making that contract is necessary.” The parties “contract towards
200
each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support.”
Marriage admits the parties to the status of married people
with a corresponding position in society. This position conveys
201
significant, tangible economic benefits.
Once a marriage is
planning for dissolution decrees. Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (2006).
Prenups rarely concern themselves with the marriage itself. Restrictions
on the marital relationship are generally held unenforceable as tending to
derogate or disrupt marriages and hence are considered counter to the public
policy of encouraging stable unions. See generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 245 (1999)
(stating that agreements that include restrictions on marriage are contrary to
public policy and are thus illegal and void). For example, several states have held
unenforceable premarital agreements not to have children. Id. § 246. In
California, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a husband and wife cannot, by
a contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property.” CAL.
FAM. CODE § 1620 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
196. “The essence of marriage [is] the voluntary bargain struck between two
parties who wanted to come together into an intimate association.” JOHN WITTE,
FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 10 (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., Westminster John Knox
Press 1997); cf. Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage
(U.C. Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 95, 2006) (explaining
that by focusing on the voluntary aspect of the marriage contract, it is usually
ignored that contract law often imposes obligations without consent).
197. See generally WITTE, supra note 196 (tracking the evolution of marriage in
several Christian traditions); cf. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN
IDEAS 149–54 (1901) (discussing the gradual evolution of marriage contracts in
Roman law from religious rituals to something more like civil contracts).
198. In Missouri, for example, “[m]arriage is considered in law as a civil
contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is
essential.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.010 (2004 & Supp. 2007); see generally MINN. STAT.
§ 517.01 (2006).
199. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 720.
200. Id. § 720. In A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts, written in
London in about 1600, H. Swinburne observed, “A present and perfect consent
alone maketh matrimony, without either public solemnization or carnal
copulation, for neither is the one nor the other the essence of matrimony, but
consent only.” LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE 67 (1990). These ideas
led to the collapse of religious control of marriage in the western world. Id.
201. Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Legal and Economic Benefits of
Marriage, http://religioustolerance.org/mar_bene.htm (listing various legally
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formed, society has some interest in preserving it. It cannot be
202
dissolved except by court action.
Like all civil contracts, marriage is regulated by the
203
government.
At a minimum, attention is given to the
204
Governments may require licensing,
competence of the parties.
a showing of the ability of the husband to support a family, proof
that neither party has a contagious or sexually transmitted disease,
205
or any number of other specific details. Invariably, the marriage
guaranteed rights and benefits of marriage) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). The
benefits most likely to be unique to marriage, and not available by or difficult to
protect by other forms of civil contract, include Social Security, Medicare, and
veterans’ benefits; the presumption of inheritance of jointly owned property
through the right of survivorship, thus avoiding probate; status of kinship for
making decisions about the care of incompetents; and various tax breaks.
202. During some historical periods, divorce has been relatively difficult to
obtain, requiring a public showing that one or both of the parties had breached
the contract in some way. At other times, during the late stages of the Roman
Empire and in Islamic tradition, divorces have been easier to obtain for the
husband. Even in no-fault American states, where divorces can be had on the
simple statements of the parties that the marriage has broken down, the
dissolution of a marriage, with the concomitant untangling of finances, duties, and
family ties, becomes an expensive and time consuming process.
203. At various times, initiating a marriage has been a complex process,
involving negotiations over the formation of marital property, transactions among
matchmakers and lawyers, and even consultations with shamans and soothsayers.
Ancient contracts went into great detail about dowries and bride-prices, about
where and in what conditions the husband and wife were to live, and even about
how many children were to be raised. In one Assyrian document from the
nineteenth century B.C., the wife agrees that if she does not produce offspring,
“she herself will purchase a slavewoman, and later on, after she has produced a
child by him he may then dispose of her by sale wherever he pleases.” Alan
Humm, Marriage and Divorce Documents from the Near East, http://ccat.sas.upenn.
edu/humm/Topics/Contracts/marri02.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). Notably,
however, there is some ambiguity in the syntax, and it is not clear which woman
can be disposed of by sale after the child is born. Sloppy legal drafting, it seems, is
not entirely a modern problem.
Western contracts were similarly complex during the early modern
period. For a discussion of early-modern European marriage contracts see MERRY
S. WIESNER, WOMEN AND GENDER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 37 (2d ed. 2005) and
MARTHA HOWELL, THE MARRIAGE EXCHANGE: PROPERTY, SOCIAL PLACE AND GENDER
IN CITIES OF THE LOW COUNTRIES (1998). For an archive of eighteenth-century
dowry contracts, see http://www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/ (follow “Ascoli”
hyperlink; then follow “Continue looking at the Ascoli Project” hyperlink) and
Humm, supra note 203 (archiving historical marriage contracts). Insight can also
be gleaned from fictional treatments of marriage. See KATHERINE ELIZABETH
JACOBS, MARRIAGE CONTRACTS FROM CHAUCER TO THE RENAISSANCE STAGE (2001).
204. MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.010 (2004 & Supp 2007); MINN. STAT. § 517.01
(2006).
205. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 197,
221 (2006) (discussing public restrictions on marriage including disease
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must be publicly proclaimed, which may be accomplished by
206
conducting a commitment ceremony before witnesses.
Many marriage contracts are reduced to writing. Positive law
207
may require the writing, or it may simply be part of the tradition
208
Beyond general vows, however, the
of a wedding ceremony.
intent of the parties is not recorded. That is not to say that specific
intent does not exist. In some cases, marriage may be motivated by
a desire to strongly improve one’s career, to create an entitlement
to tangible benefits including better housing and tax benefits, or to
establish a foundation for a family. Some people have no intent
other than to gain the status of a married person and whatever
social world marriage will open up. In these ways, marriage is
transformative. It turns bachelors and bachelorettes into husbands
and wives, allowing them to behave, and even to think, in different
ways.
Sometimes the parties expect the marriage to produce very
specific benefits. The parties may have specific ideas about what
sexual relations will be like, how housekeeping arrangements will
be made, and how finances will be handled. In plain English, the
parties have expectations. Their intentions are not typically
209
enumerated, but there are exceptions.
regulations).
206. Some states require the solemnization of a marriage and the presence of
witnesses. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 517.10 (2006). In comparison, an eighteenthcentury A.D. provision of Byzantine law required a written contract specifying the
wife’s dowry and three witnesses. The Contract of Marriage, in the Ecloga of Leo III, in
PAUL HALSALL, MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: BYZANTINE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1997),
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/byz-marr726.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2007).
207. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.220 (2003 & Supp. 2007) (requiring writing if
the status of property is altered by the marital agreement).
208. Marriage contracts create a general association expected to last “as long
as you both shall live.” Unlike business contracts, which try to control the future,
marriage contracts do not typically provide many specifics. Marriage contracts are
universally understood to create sexual exclusivity. The parties promise to forsake
all others and cleave only to the spouse. Even polygamous marriages control, to
some extent, future permissible sexual partners. Beyond this, most marriage vows
are sparse and very general. Both parties promise to love, honor, and cherish the
other. Although these words have dictionary meanings, they are used in many
different contexts and are capable of such stretching that in practice, they are as
vague as typical constitutional words like “due process of law.”
209. In Islamic tradition, for example, where marriages are not treated like
sacraments but instead more like other kinds of civil contracts, the parties are
encouraged to add stipulations to the deal. Beliefnet.com, Sample Stipulations for
Marriage Contracts, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/73/story_7377_1.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2007) (listing sample stipulations that have or could be used).
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Marital expectations cannot deal with the kinds of problems
that inevitably arise in new marriages. The counseling profession
and the clergy invariably encourage all newlyweds to discuss
finances, work arrangements, housekeeping, and the like before
marriage. Some do. Some do not. Regardless, the disruption that
occurs whenever new associations are created guarantees that
conflicts will arise even when the spouses are prepared. As the poet
Ogden Nash put it, “marriage is a legal and religious alliance
entered into/ by a man who can’t sleep with the window shut/ and
210
a woman who can’t sleep with the window open.”
Governments offer little support to parties who are trying to
adjust to marriage. Although they extensively regulate marriages,
they initially did so in pursuit of public, as opposed to marital
211
goals.
Over time, the strengths of the various public interests
212
have waxed and waned.
Government regulation of marriage has
213
For example, nineteenth-century
correspondingly altered.
These may include the husband’s promises to employ a maid, to learn to speak
and read Arabic, to share home management including child care and cleaning
whether or not the wife works outside the home, to not beat the spouse or the
children, and to discuss finances openly. Id. The wife may reserve the right to
come and go as she pleases, to work outside the home, provided the husband has
a veto over the choice of a job, to retain some property of her own, to visit her
parents whenever she chooses, and to divorce the husband on favorable financial
terms if he brings another wife into the home. Id. The wife may promise that she
will not become pregnant until the husband, or both spouses, complete some level
of education. Id. She may insist, and the husband must agree, to allow her to
bring “all twenty of her cats to live in her husband’s house.” Id. But see FEMINIST
SEXUAL ETHICS PROJECT, Marriage Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, http://www.
brandeis.edu/projects/fse/Pages/marriagecontracts.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2007).
210. OGDEN NASH, I DO, I WILL, I HAVE (1949), available at http://www.aenet.
org/poems/ognash8.htm.
211. Teitlebaum, supra note 205. For a variety of public health and eugenic
reasons, states may prohibit marriages between close relatives or people with
sexually transmitted diseases, and they may forbid legally incompetent persons to
marry entirely. Id. Because the government has an interest in sexual morality, and
because its general interest in encouraging stable marriages is threatened by
infidelity, it may forbid adultery or bigamy. See id. For similar reasons, and
because governments retain some interest in the welfare of children, states forbid
cruelty or neglect of dependents in marriage and require school attendance,
immunization, and sometimes sequestration of the individual property of
children. Id. Finally, states may make it easier or harder to divorce and may retain
some control over the “disposition” of children after a divorce. Id.
212. For example, the government’s interest in private sexual morality.
213. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW
44–47 (2004). Harald Fuess has recently argued that similar changes occurred in
nineteenth-century Japanese society. HARALD FUESS, DIVORCE IN JAPAN: FAMILY,
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notions of racial purity, once popular, fell into disrepute during the
twentieth century. Laws that prohibited cohabitation and marriage
between people of different races were gradually repealed or struck
214
down.
Still, the government enforces regulations for its own
purposes.
Courts will not enforce the specific intent of the couple when
it is called upon to adjudicate issues within the marital relationship.
For example, the court cannot be petitioned to resolve a husband’s
complaint regarding the lack of sexual affection in the marriage,
and a wife’s disapproval that her husband is not doing his share of
the housework will likewise be unavailing. There is a presumption
that the intimate details of any marriage are, or should be private,
215
and that they should not be discussed in a public forum.
It is
believed that exposing the intimate details of a marriage to public
scrutiny tends to weaken the marriage and, thus, is contrary to the
216
public policy of encouraging strong marriages.
When spouses
cannot achieve their specific goals on their own and the courts
refuse to interfere, the relationship may break down entirely,
resulting in divorce. Ironically, divorce inevitably requires some
level of governmental response. Divorce, however, is not an
improvement or correction to a relationship. It is the obliteration
of a marriage.

GENDER AND THE STATE (2004).
214. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (cohabitation);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage). In California, no marriage
regulation may ever require that an applicant state his or her race or color “for any
purpose.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 354(d) (2004). Similarly, most states have now
repealed requirements that the parties obtain blood tests to detect sexually
transmitted diseases before marriage licenses could be issued. See generally U.S.
Marriage Laws, http://usmarriagelaws.com (collecting state licensing
requirements).
215. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965), the Court forbid
states from inquiring into decisions to use birth control:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. We
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred.
Id. (emphasis added). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 162.
216. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.4 (3d ed. 1999)
(stating that contract provisions counter to public policy will not be enforced by
civil courts); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS 2, 19 (3d ed. 1987).
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In this way, a marriage contract is the counter-example to the
insistence that the enforcement of a contract requires a court to
put into effect the specific intent of the parties. The box company
can invoke the assistance of a court in making the contractual
relationship what the makers intended it to be while the unhappy
spouse is left to his or her own devices. Courts can regulate the
marital relationship, but they do so in ways that have everything to
do with the public interest and little to do with the specific
217
intentions of the husband and wife.
The United States Constitution is much more like a marriage
contract than it is like an ordinary contract such as a promissory
note, deed, or will. It is a foundation document that establishes an
open-ended association and transforms its parties in relation to that
association. Accordingly, it may be possible to take one more step
and argue that because the Constitution functionally creates a
marriage, it must be interpreted in courts as though it were a
marriage contract. But that argument merely repeats the mistake
of the originalists who over-generalize from the metaphor.
In many respects, however, the Constitution is different from a
marriage contract. That is the point. The Constitution is unique.
It is a document, but it also houses ideas and our national spirit. As
an idea, it is also a symbol to which people attach loyalty and
patriotism. The Constitution is not just a symbol, like the flag. It is
to be applied in courts according to its hierarchical status as the
218
“supreme” source of law.
Nevertheless, it is not just a legal
217. Since no argument is ever truly new, it is not surprising that at least once
before a writer has resorted to the marriage metaphor to suggest the proper
interpretation of a foundation contract. In his exploration of what Locke’s
contemporaries understood when the word contract was used in political
discourse, Martyn P. Thompson discusses the work of Robert Jenkin, a longforgotten Jacobite pamphleteer. See THOMPSON, supra note 155, at 40 (discussing
ROBERT JENKIN, THE TITLE OF A USURPER AFTER A THOROUGH SETTLEMENT
EXAMINED, IN ANSWER TO DR. SHERLOCK’S CASE OF ALLEGIANCE (1690)). After
Parliament decided, in 1688, that Catholic King James II had broken the original
contract of government by fleeing the country, Jenkin tried to show that King
James remained the legal King because the contract could not be broken. Id. He
argued that unlike ordinary contracts the original contract was made “before god”
and it was like a marriage in being solemnized. Id. Therefore, like a marriage it
could never be broken. Jenkin used the analogy to argue, as here, that there are
different kinds of contracts. But his specifically Catholic view of marriage probably
failed to convince the great majority of English citizens, whose Protestant political
consciousness included the divorces of Henry VIII.
218. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution declares that
“[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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document. No method of interpretation is complete unless all the
various facets of the Constitution are considered.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must give the Constitution a legal effect, so their
decisions are partial. They deal with immediate details, not broad
generalities. That does not mean that their decisions must follow
the framers’ original intent. Originalists argue that no great
mischief comes from pursuing the intent of the framers and that
some good may come of the exercise. In this view, if judges limit
their decisions to enforcing original intent, they are enforcing a
sort of self-restraint. This will keep them from distorting the law
219
with their own policy preferences. To this argument, two replies
may be given. First, adherence, or at least lip service, to originalism
220
has not prevented considerable distortion. Second, relationships
221
The parties must necessarily be allowed to
necessarily evolve.
219. BORK, supra note 6; Richard G. Stevens, Introduction to SOBER AS A JUDGE,
supra note 192, at 1–24. The notion that only judges can save our ancient liberties,
by saving them from themselves, has been the originalists’ political battle cry. Id.
220. See supra, Part IV.B.3 (discussing the evolving nature of the marital
relationship).
221. This argument may be difficult to place in its legal context. The marriage
contract metaphor may suggest a way to grasp it. For we may ask again, why do
courts refuse to enforce specific intent within marriages? Surely the reason is that
relationships necessarily evolve, and the decision-making structure that evolves
within any marriage is intimately connected with the task of planning for, or
adapting quickly to, unforeseen change. Change may come from within the
parties themselves as they age. For example, sexual appetites naturally wane or are
transformed, infirmities and unplanned diseases interfere with a spouse’s ability to
perform chores or provide economic support, and new interests develop while old
attachments fade. The metaphor reminds us that it is the working out of the
change through intimate discussions that is the very heart of the marriage
relationship. Change may also come from changing circumstances. Children
arrive and make their own demands on time and finances. Relatives may make
still other demands. Fortune smiles, or perhaps richer becomes poorer.
Finally, change can be the result of adaptation to changes in the larger
world. The 1960s encouraged greater social experimentation, while political and
financial changes in the 1970s made it necessary for more women to secure jobs
outside middle-class households. Had courts enforced the specific intent of
newlyweds of 1955 on families of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it might have frozen
marriages and prevented any evolution at all. The new middle-class husband of
1955 was proud that his wife did not need to work outside of the home. It
reflected well on his ability to “provide.” If that intent had been enforced when
the economy weakened after 1970, then that marriage may have fallen on
disastrously hard times. Something even worse would have occurred. The court
would have substituted itself, and a mechanical rule, for the process of intimate
decision making that would have made it possible for the marriage to adapt.
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respond to changed intentions, perspectives, and circumstances.
The nation must also be allowed to adapt to changes in the larger
world.
Originalism is simply the wrong interpretive method to use for
a document that creates a participatory government designed to
respond to and deal with change. Originalism looks to the past
when courts should be contemplating the future. It stiffens what
should be flexible and substitutes a process of judicial archaeology
for the kind of vigorous public debate embraced during the
Constitution’s ratification.
The need for flexibility in facing unplanned and unexpected
change is the most significant argument in favor of an adaptive or
evolutionary method of interpreting the Constitution. Some of the
founders seem to have been aware of this. Chief Justice John
222
Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland:
[The Constitution is] intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by
which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the
character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a
legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can
223
best be provided for as they occur.
The founders understood that much of their work from 1787
to 1789 was driven by immediate political need. Many of the
224
framers eschewed the original intent approach.
Thomas
Jefferson warned against attributing to the people of the past a
225
wisdom more than human.
No form of interpretation can be legitimate unless it gives
222. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
223. Id. at 415.
224. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
225. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 367 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40 (1903)).
Even so, in the course of our public dialogue regarding the scope and proper
application of the Constitution, we should still review certain artifacts of the
founding generation. We should review these artifacts not because we must be
bound by the original intent but because they offer valuable insight. As Jack
Rakove suggests, “the meditations about popular government that we encounter
there remain more profound than those that the ordinary politics of our endless
democratic present usually sustain.” Id. at 368.
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effect to the overriding intent of the founders to create a
226
The government cannot be
participatory government.
understood without reference to the citizenry to which it is linked.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has written that the
Constitution is basically “a set of detailed provisions designed to
create democratic political institutions that will last . . . . A
participatory democracy that has those attributes is really what the
227
Constitution is trying to create.”
The people need to address the exigencies that arise through
discussions on an individual basis and with their elected
228
representatives.
Additionally, judicial review “forces a
conversation within the polity about what the Constitution should
229
mean.” This serves a useful function. The dialogue initiated by a
court case can lead to changes in public opinion, backlash, explicit
constitutional modification, or even reversal.

226. HARRIS, supra note 179 (stating that the Constitution “narrates the polity
into existence”).
227. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 12–13
(2005); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 17–35 (2006) (explaining the need for Justices to look at cases in
light of how their decisions will promote the Constitution’s aim of promoting
participation by citizens in the processes of government, or what Justice Breyer
calls “active liberty”).
228. See Meese, supra note 145, at 53, 57 (1990) (explaining that the
Constitution offers a set of structures within which political factions can fairly
compete).
229. Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of
Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2004).
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